In the notes of the book End of Faith it says:
Moore claimed that our judgments of goodness cannot be reduced to other properties like happiness. He would have undoubtedly argued that I had committed the naturalistic fallacy in defining ethics in terms of human happiness.
Moore felt that his “open question argument” was decisive here: it would seem, for instance, that we can always coherently ask of any state of happiness, “Is this form of happiness itself good?” The fact that the question still makes sense suggests that happiness and goodness cannot be the same. I would argue, however, that we are really asking in such a case is “Is this form of happiness conducive to (or obstructive of) some higher happiness?” This question is also coherent, and keeps our notion of what is good linked to the experience of sentient beings.
What does everyone think about Sam’s argument here?
Has he managed to define ethics in terms of human happiness without invoking the naturalistic fallacy?
Is Sam Harris effectively arguing that - Good is any state of happiness that is conducive to some higher happiness?
If this is the case then we could still apply the “open question argument” by saying “Is this form of higher happiness itself good?
Harris did not explain what he meant by higher happiness. Maybe a utilitarian would think that higher happiness is anything for the greater good of society.