4 of 9
4
A universe from nothing… BS
Posted: 15 January 2012 09:58 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 46 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 15 January 2012 03:06 PM

Well this is great news.  So now you’re just as happy with a panexperientialist defence of C as a panpsychist one!  Well its a step in the right direction at least.  Just have to get you to panprotoexperientialism & we’re home!

Panpsychism or panexperientalism, same thing to me. I do not agree with the proto part, because it implies emergence, and then the problem remains identical. Same goes for neutral monism. It seems like positions for people who are unwilling to take a stance or afraid to consider that C can be fundamental.

Srrr - I would not rely on linguistic similarities to make a point.  I think the semantics of emergence can be gleened from the statement “Such a system has no a priori objects or laws, and is evolved using a bootstrap system”.  This really is a claim for strong emergence within his model that is also “panexperientialist in character”.  So if you want to take on Cahill’s version of panexperientialism then you will also have to support his idea of strong emergence.  The only way that would be possible is if his version of panexperientialism is a weak version, i.e. it is really panprotoexperientialism - which is something that seems compatible with “my” materialistic monism…

Well read the paper again, he uses the term “emergence” in so many different ways that its lost all its meaning. A system with no objects or laws does not imply emergence. He mentions that the whole thing is basically a selforganising (semantic) information processing system. I dont think he says anywhere that noninformation emerges from that. Also if you remember my objections to emergence, i always said the only examples of emergence are conscious examples, and others have pointed out that emergence it is a psychological phenomenon, not a physical one. The mind is much more flexible than physical ingredients as described by physics.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 January 2012 12:02 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 47 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  173
Joined  2011-10-16
srrr - 15 January 2012 09:58 PM
Michael Kean - 15 January 2012 03:06 PM

Well this is great news.  So now you’re just as happy with a panexperientialist defence of C as a panpsychist one!  Well its a step in the right direction at least.  Just have to get you to panprotoexperientialism & we’re home!

Panpsychism or panexperientalism, same thing to me. I do not agree with the proto part, because it implies emergence, and then the problem remains identical. Same goes for neutral monism. It seems like positions for people who are unwilling to take a stance or afraid to consider that C can be fundamental.

Ok - I get that now, but all those discussions with Eucaryote where cognition was perhaps mistakenly inferred to be attached to all entities now has to be understood in this new light.  We are now back to a kind of primordial C that is not cognizant and weakly emerged to become cognizant in human consciousness.  Not that far away from my thinking anymore! 

Srrr - I would not rely on linguistic similarities to make a point.  I think the semantics of emergence can be gleened from the statement “Such a system has no a priori objects or laws, and is evolved using a bootstrap system”.  This really is a claim for strong emergence within his model that is also “panexperientialist in character”.  So if you want to take on Cahill’s version of panexperientialism then you will also have to support his idea of strong emergence.  The only way that would be possible is if his version of panexperientialism is a weak version, i.e. it is really panprotoexperientialism - which is something that seems compatible with “my” materialistic monism…

Well read the paper again, he uses the term “emergence” in so many different ways that its lost all its meaning. A system with no objects or laws does not imply emergence. He mentions that the whole thing is basically a selforganising (semantic) information processing system. I dont think he says anywhere that noninformation emerges from that. Also if you remember my objections to emergence, i always said the only examples of emergence are conscious examples, and others have pointed out that emergence it is a psychological phenomenon, not a physical one. The mind is much more flexible than physical ingredients as described by physics.

I don’t agree at all - he uses the idea of emergence very clearly and in a unique and interesting manner.  It is perhaps a difficult paper to read for those without a scientific background, but LTRD (let the reader decide).  In fact this was the key reason why I referenced the paper.  His system starts with no “a priori” objects or laws but it ends with a universe of 3 dimensions of space, with time, with matter and with laws!  That is exactly “something from nothing” and “strong emergence”.  It is a model or system that starts with no meaning but develops meaning (or semantics) within itself as it emerges.  So God or C doesn’t supply the meaning or values, we do as part of the same self-organising system or ‘deep ecology’.  He argues that his system or model works and explains new phenomena because it avoids Gödel limitations by allowing the system to fractally emerge in and of itself.


But that said, I understand you will still reject strong emergence.  This is your choice.  But at least I have provided one model of how it might work that is not a simple or crude “conscious example” or just a subjective taxonomy of the attributes of particle physics or just a “psychological phenomenon”.  Interestingly though, his model does rely on an understanding of neural networks.  I see this as supporting the idea that the ‘design’ of human consciousness, which I count as an example of strong emergence, is no ‘accident’! (No woo-woo intended). smile

[ Edited: 16 January 2012 12:06 AM by Michael Kean]
 Signature 

“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”  (The first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted unanimously by the Virginia Convention of Delegates on June 12, 1776)

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 January 2012 07:10 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 48 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 16 January 2012 12:02 AM

Ok - I get that now, but all those discussions with Eucaryote where cognition was perhaps mistakenly inferred to be attached to all entities now has to be understood in this new light.  We are now back to a kind of primordial C that is not cognizant and weakly emerged to become cognizant in human consciousness.  Not that far away from my thinking anymore!

I dont know what you mean with “cognizant”. 

I don’t agree at all - he uses the idea of emergence very clearly and in a unique and interesting manner.  It is perhaps a difficult paper to read for those without a scientific background, but LTRD (let the reader decide).  In fact this was the key reason why I referenced the paper.  His system starts with no “a priori” objects or laws but it ends with a universe of 3 dimensions of space, with time, with matter and with laws!  That is exactly “something from nothing” and “strong emergence”.  It is a model or system that starts with no meaning but develops meaning (or semantics) within itself as it emerges.  So God or C doesn’t supply the meaning or values, we do as part of the same self-organising system or ‘deep ecology’.  He argues that his system or model works and explains new phenomena because it avoids Gödel limitations by allowing the system to fractally emerge in and of itself.


But that said, I understand you will still reject strong emergence.  This is your choice.  But at least I have provided one model of how it might work that is not a simple or crude “conscious example” or just a subjective taxonomy of the attributes of particle physics or just a “psychological phenomenon”.  Interestingly though, his model does rely on an understanding of neural networks.  I see this as supporting the idea that the ‘design’ of human consciousness, which I count as an example of strong emergence, is no ‘accident’! (No woo-woo intended). :)

From what ive read, the paper assumes information is fundamental, and everything that “emerges” from it is still information. Some quotes:

In process physics the fundamental assumption is that reality is to be modelled as self-organising semantic information, that is, information that is ‘internally’ meaningful, using a self-referentially limited neural network model. Such a system has no a priori objects or laws, and is evolved using a bootstrap system, so that it is the system itself that ‘internally’ creates patterns of relationships and their dominant modes of behaviour, and all (sub)systems are fractal in character, that is, relationships within relationships, and so on ad infinitum. In this way all emergent phenomena are unified, and it is this key feature that has resulted in an understanding and linking, for the first time, of various phenomena. A key feature of this process-physics is that this fracticality is associated with self-organising criticality. 


Having set up a processing information-theoretic system in which all information is internally generated and recognised we have explored in considerable detail the nature of the emergent information and shown that [...]

One way to interpret this is that reality has a primitive form of self-awareness. In increasingly more complex systems such as biological systems this self-awareness may manifest as consciousness.

I did see he mentions that it is nonreductionist, but that seems to be a consequence of it relying on random information (“truths”). Anyway, information that leads to different information, or information that gets more complex, is what weak emergence is all about. An example of it in the paper is where he says that both space and quantum matter are still fundamentally nonlocal.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 January 2012 07:24 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 49 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  173
Joined  2011-10-16
srrr - 16 January 2012 07:10 AM

I dont know what you mean with “cognizant”.

I mean it in the sense of having knowledge.  For instance a Christian would say God is “omni-scient” or “all-knowing”.  A panpsychist may not go that far, I’m not sure, but she would definitely suggest that primordial C embodies a certain innate “knowing”, as per what a human mind often thinks it does.  Whereas, as I understand it, a panexperientialist would not assign a certain innate “truth knowing” to primordial C, but rather a more simple kind of subjective experiencing or other subjective phenomenology.  This gets back to my key question to you in the past - “What does your primordial C do?”.  But firstly we would need to understand the exact nature of primordial C.  I’d still genuinely like to know your answers in some detail.  I’ll try to explain why below because it is completely relevant to this thread and “the mystery of consciousness” thread.

From what ive read, the paper assumes information is fundamental, and everything that “emerges” from it is still information. Some quotes:

all (sub)systems are fractal in character, that is, relationships within relationships, and so on ad infinitum 


the nature of the emergent information


In increasingly more complex systems such as biological systems this self-awareness may manifest as consciousness.


I did see he mentions that it is nonreductionist, but that seems to be a consequence of it relying on random information (“truths”). Anyway, information that leads to different information, or information that gets more complex, is what weak emergence is all about. An example of it in the paper is where he says that both space and quantum matter are still fundamentally nonlocal.

Ok - so let’s clarify a few things here.  I will use “data” as a word that better describes what I think you mean by “random information”.  “Random information”, after all, is actually a tautology.  Data does not become information until it non-randomised or organised or systemetised.  Only then can we talk of “information” and “truths”.  So from random data arises or emerges information in a self-organising universe.  Informationally speaking, we could rephrase this and say that from no information emerges information in a self-organising universe, i.e. from nothing arises something!  Put another way - from semantic nothingness emerges semantic somethingness!  This brings us right back to our notion of nothingness.  Krauss was saying that science’s notion of nothingness has changed over the last 50 years or more, largely due to QM.  QM has shown us that nothingness is not as we once pictured it before the Uncertainty Principle came along.  The Uncertainty Principle tells us that space cannot be empty, but rather, the best way to picture it, is that it is largely a bubbling broth of sticky stuff that continually but transiently pops in and out of physical existence.  There are particles-antiparticle pairs that routinely form and eliminate/self-annihilate.  So nothingness is actually a kind of uneasy tension or equilibrium between ‘everything’ and not classical ‘nothing’ - but ‘anti-everything’.


So now we get back to the nature of primordial C and what it does.  Under this definition, the nature of primordial C fits perfectly, I think, with panprotoexperientialism.  The nature of primordial C is “random data” - not information as such, but certainly ready to burst into information (and space-time-matter) at every turn!  So the “informational C” we see in this universe emerges or splits off from this primordial C.  The “informational C” is the virtual particles that mediate the four interactions of the Standard Model, for instance.  But the informational C is much more than this.  It is the inherent non-randomness or organisation in all the varying arrangements of matter (or the “systems” of matter).  It is the space/time in matter/space/time.  Matter is the direct and informational C or space/time is the indirect in our universe.


So now we can get to the idea of what C does.  Primordial C just bubbles away, waiting for a chance to manifest itself in informational C via matter.  Informational C is firstly caused by an asymmetry arising between particles and anti-particles that somehow permits those particles to endure and not obliterate each other in the bubbling soup.  Next, informational C is simply all the information that exists in matter’s arrangements and systems (including the brain’s systems).  So informational C is a kind of upholder of matter, but the inverse is also true (matter is an upholder of informational C.  However I don’t believe in a perfect Supersymmetry between matter and space/time (or informational C) because I suspect that a measure of asymmetry between matter and space/time is needed for entropy and emergence to be possible.


Getting back to human consciousness, I think this is the highest arrangement of matter &/or informational C that exists in our universe.


BTW I think what you’re getting from the term “nonlocal” could be a little misunderstood.  There is nothing mystical here.  He means it in a quantum mechanical sense or “QSD” sense (see section 6.4 “Emergent Classicality” and section 7.0 “Emergent Quantum Field Theory of Matter”), but I admit the detailed physics is beyond me.  For instance when quantum entanglement (before collapse) can result in an aligned spin of particles that are “non-local”, or separated in geographical location by arbitrarily large distances.  Classical gravity, manifested in the planets orbiting our sun for instance, is another example of the non-local properties of fundamental interactions in our universe.


BTW the other term you pick up on is “nonreductionist”.  The idea that Process Physics is non-reductionist is key to avoiding the Gödel limitations that are inherent in all our other scientific & mathematical modelling of chunks of reality.  The way that it avoids Gödel limitations is that the model is entirely self-initiating, self-referencing and self-organising.  No axiomatic basis is required; i.e. no basic axiomatic “information” or “cognitive mathematics” is required.  No human subjectivity is required.  That is, nothingness is required.  And somethingness from nothingness emerges not through “design” or some other “psychological process” but through the uncertainty or instability or noise inherent in nothingness and its random data (and is also always there in the midst of somethingness)...


Thanks srrr for making me think about all of this!

[ Edited: 16 January 2012 10:16 PM by Michael Kean]
 Signature 

“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”  (The first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted unanimously by the Virginia Convention of Delegates on June 12, 1776)

Profile
 
 
Posted: 17 January 2012 07:09 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 50 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 16 January 2012 07:24 PM

I mean it in the sense of having knowledge.  For instance a Christian would say God is “omni-scient” or “all-knowing”.  A panpsychist may not go that far, I’m not sure, but she would definitely suggest that primordial C embodies a certain innate “knowing”, as per what a human mind often thinks it does.  Whereas, as I understand it, a panexperientialist would not assign a certain innate “truth knowing” to primordial C, but rather a more simple kind of subjective experiencing or other subjective phenomenology.  This gets back to my key question to you in the past - “What does your primordial C do?”.  But firstly we would need to understand the exact nature of primordial C.  I’d still genuinely like to know your answers in some detail.  I’ll try to explain why below because it is completely relevant to this thread and “the mystery of consciousness” thread.

I consider all knowing a type of experience: it feels like something to know something. An experience always entails knowledge: when you see a color, you know what it is like to see the color. So if someone has the thought “1+1=5”, then intellectually that may be nonsense, but it does provide him knowledge of what it feels like to have such a thought.


To answer the question of what a primordial C does, i would look at all known capabilities of consciousness (human or animal) and extrapolate from that.

Ok - so let’s clarify a few things here.  I will use “data” as a word that better describes what I think you mean by “random information”.  “Random information”, after all, is actually a tautology.  Data does not become information until it non-randomised or organised or systemetised.  Only then can we talk of “information” and “truths”.  So from random data arises or emerges information in a self-organising universe.  Informationally speaking, we could rephrase this and say that from no information emerges information in a self-organising universe, i.e. from nothing arises something!  Put another way - from semantic nothingness emerges semantic somethingness!  This brings us right back to our notion of nothingness.  Krauss was saying that science’s notion of nothingness has changed over the last 50 years or more, largely due to QM.  QM has shown us that nothingness is not as we once pictured it before the Uncertainty Principle came along.  The Uncertainty Principle tells us that space cannot be empty, but rather, the best way to picture it, is that it is largely a bubbling broth of sticky stuff that continually but transiently pops in and out of physical existence.  There are particles-antiparticle pairs that routinely form and eliminate/self-annihilate.  So nothingness is actually a kind of uneasy tension or equilibrium between ‘everything’ and not classical ‘nothing’ - but ‘anti-everything’.

The paper doesnt mention “data”, or the difference between “data” and “information” you talk about. My first reaction is that there is no difference between data and information.

Btw, it is often said that the particles pop “in and out of existence” (from the quantum foam), but what is really meant is that energy from the foam is turned into particles. This brings me back at my earlier comment about the nature of “energy”, which is an entirely abstract concept. People who believe energy actually exists out there, have unknowingly slipped into idealism.

So now we get back to the nature of primordial C and what it does.  Under this definition, the nature of primordial C fits perfectly, I think, with panprotoexperientialism.  The nature of primordial C is “random data” - not information as such, but certainly ready to burst into information (and space-time-matter) at every turn!  So the “informational C” we see in this universe emerges or splits off from this primordial C.  The “informational C” is the virtual particles that mediate the four interactions of the Standard Model, for instance.  But the informational C is much more than this.  It is the inherent non-randomness or organisation in all the varying arrangements of matter (or the “systems” of matter).  It is the space/time in matter/space/time.  Matter is the direct and informational C or space/time is the indirect in our universe.


So now we can get to the idea of what C does.  Primordial C just bubbles away, waiting for a chance to manifest itself in informational C via matter.  Informational C is firstly caused by an asymmetry arising between particles and anti-particles that somehow permits those particles to endure and not obliterate each other in the bubbling soup.  Next, informational C is simply all the information that exists in matter’s arrangements and systems (including the brain’s systems).  So informational C is a kind of upholder of matter, but the inverse is also true (matter is an upholder of informational C.  However I don’t believe in a perfect Supersymmetry between matter and space/time (or informational C) because I suspect that a measure of asymmetry between matter and space/time is needed for entropy and emergence to be possible.


Getting back to human consciousness, I think this is the highest arrangement of matter &/or informational C that exists in our universe.


BTW I think what you’re getting from the term “nonlocal” could be a little misunderstood.  There is nothing mystical here.  He means it in a quantum mechanical sense or “QSD” sense (see section 6.4 “Emergent Classicality” and section 7.0 “Emergent Quantum Field Theory of Matter”), but I admit the detailed physics is beyond me.  For instance when quantum entanglement (before collapse) can result in an aligned spin of particles that are “non-local”, or separated in geographical location by arbitrarily large distances.  Classical gravity, manifested in the planets orbiting our sun for instance, is another example of the non-local properties of fundamental interactions in our universe.


BTW the other term you pick up on is “nonreductionist”.  The idea that Process Physics is non-reductionist is key to avoiding the Gödel limitations that are inherent in all our other scientific & mathematical modelling of chunks of reality.  The way that it avoids Gödel limitations is that the model is entirely self-initiating, self-referencing and self-organising.  No axiomatic basis is required; i.e. no basic axiomatic “information” or “cognitive mathematics” is required.  No human subjectivity is required.  That is, nothingness is required.  And somethingness from nothingness emerges not through “design” or some other “psychological process” but through the uncertainty or instability or noise inherent in nothingness and its random data (and is also always there in the midst of somethingness)...


Thanks srrr for making me think about all of this!

Yes i mean non-local in the same way as the paper. He says that space is actually nonlocal, and that suggests he doesnt think it strongly emerges since the starting situation was nonlocal too. And i agree that the human brain has a very complex type of consciousness, just like the matter of the brain is complex. As for information, data or models, whenever those exist, consciousness is always required because they are conceptual.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 17 January 2012 07:22 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 51 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  173
Joined  2011-10-16
srrr - 17 January 2012 07:09 AM

I consider all knowing a type of experience: it feels like something to know something. An experience always entails knowledge: when you see a color, you know what it is like to see the color. So if someone has the thought “1+1=5”, then intellectually that may be nonsense, but it does provide him knowledge of what it feels like to have such a thought.

Knowing and experience are not the same thing: Hence the distinction between panpsychism & pan(proto)experientialism.  But if you want to insist that knowing and experience are exactly the same thing in primordial C, then welcome on board to panprotoexperientialism!

To answer the question of what a primordial C does, i would look at all known capabilities of consciousness (human or animal) and extrapolate from that.

I think you mean interpolate.  But what does it matter - it’s all analysis and reductionism!  Seems like you will let others decide what are “all known capabilities” but won’t analyse any for yourself!

The paper doesnt mention “data”, or the difference between “data” and “information” you talk about. My first reaction is that there is no difference between data and information.

The paper doesn’t need to use the word data if the semantics of data are nevertheless there.  For instance “such a system has no a priori objects or laws” means it initially has no information or semantics.  But the system must have some kind of random data points otherwise nothing could emerge.  Again the aversion to analysis!  But if there is no difference between data and information then again there is no difference between panpsychism & pan(proto)experientialism.  Again - welcome on board to panprotoexperientialism!

Btw, it is often said that the particles pop “in and out of existence” (from the quantum foam), but what is really meant is that energy from the foam is turned into particles. This brings me back at my earlier comment about the nature of “energy”, which is an entirely abstract concept. People who believe energy actually exists out there, have unknowingly slipped into idealism.

Energy as you define it here is your subjective “conceptualisation”.  What I’d suggest to help cure your scientific ignorance is that you sign up to the LHC Bulletin from Cern by email and look at their announcements first hand.


Srrr - wisdom is an antinomic dance between analysis and synthesis of our environment.  If you continually rely on intuition separated from reality you’re headed for trouble.  Your pretty good at power games, so I guess you’ll get by for a while, but eventually more trouble will come.  And if you stick to non-reductionism then all you have is irreducible “Gaia” and your concept of C would have to grow to accomodate this view: Extreme non-reductionism is just as bad a extreme reductionism.  The alternative to a simple emerging something from nothing that non-reductionist extremism implies is a non-emergent and miraculous or at least mysterious ‘everything in C’ from nothing.  C becomes ineffable.  As you know, I have nothing against a somewhat Gaian deep ecology (or more generally a self-contained and self-organising universe), but I also recognise that analysis, even though some materialists have done it to death, does have its place.  A philosophy of Emergence really is your answer.  It recognises that both analysis and synthesis (or reductionism and non-reductionsim) have their place and avoids a kind of “sacred” or “superstitious” C which I’m guessing you would support.

Yes i mean non-local in the same way as the paper. He says that space is actually nonlocal, and that suggests he doesnt think it strongly emerges since the starting situation was nonlocal too. And i agree that the human brain has a very complex type of consciousness, just like the matter of the brain is complex. As for information, data or models, whenever those exist, consciousness is always required because they are conceptual.

How do you jump from non-local to non-emergent?  The rest is the same old extreme non-reductionist thinking that I have addressed above.

 Signature 

“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”  (The first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted unanimously by the Virginia Convention of Delegates on June 12, 1776)

Profile
 
 
Posted: 18 January 2012 12:45 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 52 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 17 January 2012 07:22 PM

Knowing and experience are not the same thing: Hence the distinction between panpsychism & pan(proto)experientialism.  But if you want to insist that knowing and experience are exactly the same thing in primordial C, then welcome on board to panprotoexperientialism!

Then i dont understand what you mean with “knowing”. All the “knowing” i do is experienced.


Can you give an example of the “knowing” that you are talking about?

I think you mean interpolate.  But what does it matter - it’s all analysis and reductionism!  Seems like you will let others decide what are “all known capabilities” but won’t analyse any for yourself!

No its more like “its so obvious i dont even need to mention it”. Known capabilities of minds are seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, thinking, doing math, emotions, language, semantics, manipulating information, etc. We can go back in evolutionary time, organisms get simpler and simpler, inanimate physical structures get simpler, and we head towards what i call “simple C” (primordial C) . We can extrapolate that the known capabilities of mind get simpler too. For example, we may see lots of different things with our eyes, but a simple version of that would be just seeing a single color without any differentiation or structure. The same goes for our other senses. Eventually i think all our senses stem from a single and simpler type of experiencing. Our 5 (or more) senses are then really just specialisations of that single type of experiencing. I have my reasons for thinking this and if youre really interested i will explain, but i dont have time right now. So much for our 5 senses, but with math, language, semantics, etc. the question is if simpler means less/worse that what the human brain does. For example a mind that is not constantly bombarded with all the sensory input and thoughts needed for survival (not to mention our obsession with procreating), might well be a mind that excels in math and manipulating information. Just look at a small and simple calculator and it can already beat the human brain.

The paper doesn’t need to use the word data if the semantics of data are nevertheless there.  For instance “such a system has no a priori objects or laws” means it initially has no information or semantics.  But the system must have some kind of random data points otherwise nothing could emerge.  Again the aversion to analysis!  But if there is no difference between data and information then again there is no difference between panpsychism & pan(proto)experientialism.  Again - welcome on board to panprotoexperientialism!

This seems like your subjective interpretation of the paper. The paper does not mention the data you speak of. It also (as far as ive read), does not mention that information is created from non-information. A law is a set mechanism, and the lack of that does not imply lack of information. A lack of objects doesnt either.

Energy as you define it here is your subjective “conceptualisation”.  What I’d suggest to help cure your scientific ignorance is that you sign up to the LHC Bulletin from Cern by email and look at their announcements first hand.

No im talking about energy as it is used in physics. For example, look at what Feynman writes:

There is a fact, or if you wish, a law, governing all natural phenomena that are known to date. There is no known exception to this law—it is exact so far as we know. The law is called the conservation of energy. It states that there is a certain quantity, which we call energy, that does not change in manifold changes which nature undergoes. That is a most abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that there is a numerical quantity which does not change when something happens. It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange fact that we can calculate some number and when we finish watching nature go through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy

Yes, math is very important in physics. That does not change the fact that math is conceptual and that when you assume that reality is fundamentally mathematical, you have assumed platonic idealism.

Srrr - wisdom is an antinomic dance between analysis and synthesis of our environment.  If you continually rely on intuition separated from reality you’re headed for trouble.  Your pretty good at power games, so I guess you’ll get by for a while, but eventually more trouble will come.  And if you stick to non-reductionism then all you have is irreducible “Gaia” and your concept of C would have to grow to accomodate this view: Extreme non-reductionism is just as bad a extreme reductionism.  The alternative to a simple emerging something from nothing that non-reductionist extremism implies is a non-emergent and miraculous or at least mysterious ‘everything in C’ from nothing.  C becomes ineffable.  As you know, I have nothing against a somewhat Gaian deep ecology (or more generally a self-contained and self-organising universe), but I also recognise that analysis, even though some materialists have done it to death, does have its place.  A philosophy of Emergence really is your answer.  It recognises that both analysis and synthesis (or reductionism and non-reductionsim) have their place and avoids a kind of “sacred” or “superstitious” C which I’m guessing you would support.

There certainly is no excuse grasping at magic explanations (strong emergence). I dont understand why so many people fall for that. What i do, and suggest others to do, is to stick closely to known natural facts and extrapolate from there. That way, you get the support of all the best science.

How do you jump from non-local to non-emergent?  The rest is the same old extreme non-reductionist thinking that I have addressed above.

I just pointed out that the paper considers both space and its origin non-local, so at the very least there is no strong emergence of locality from non-locality. If you think otherwise, the burden is upon you, not me, to point out what it is that is strongly emergent according to the paper.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 19 January 2012 02:44 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 53 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  173
Joined  2011-10-16
srrr - 18 January 2012 12:45 AM

Then i dont understand what you mean with “knowing”. All the “knowing” i do is experienced.


Can you give an example of the “knowing” that you are talking about?

Knowing some “truth” clearly has a part that is greater than mere experience or “the (subjective) feeing of knowing”.  It can imply an acceptance of objective reality, as you have indicated you do, and knowing something of that objective reality.  It can also imply a reductionist knowing of an analysed part of reality.

To answer the question of what a primordial C does, i would look at all known capabilities of consciousness (human or animal) and extrapolate from that…


Known capabilities of minds are seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, thinking, doing math, emotions, language, semantics, manipulating information, etc. We can go back in evolutionary time, organisms get simpler and simpler, inanimate physical structures get simpler, and we head towards what i call “simple C” (primordial C) . We can extrapolate that the known capabilities of mind get simpler too. For example, we may see lots of different things with our eyes, but a simple version of that would be just seeing a single color without any differentiation or structure. The same goes for our other senses. Eventually i think all our senses stem from a single and simpler type of experiencing. Our 5 (or more) senses are then really just specialisations of that single type of experiencing. I have my reasons for thinking this and if youre really interested i will explain, but i dont have time right now. So much for our 5 senses, but with math, language, semantics, etc. the question is if simpler means less/worse that what the human brain does. For example a mind that is not constantly bombarded with all the sensory input and thoughts needed for survival (not to mention our obsession with procreating), might well be a mind that excels in math and manipulating information. Just look at a small and simple calculator and it can already beat the human brain.

Ok - I think you can guess my difficulty with your answer.  You try to interpolate from the 5 senses of modern human mind/bodies to primordial C (PC) that has no body and, according to your interpolations, simply “experiences”.  But how does PC experience without a body at all?  So yes, I would like the detailed explanation when you have the time.


I said “such a system has no a priori objects or laws” means it initially has no information or semantics but rather just random data.  You answered

The paper ... does not mention that information is created from non-information. A law is a set mechanism, and the lack of that does not imply lack of information. A lack of objects doesnt either.

I think the idea that information is created is the whole point of the paper and of emergence.  And what is information created from?  Surely in its most basic form, it is created from disorganised data of some kind.  But how can we know it is disorganised?  Because it does not conform to some rule or law that if followed, would cause the data to be organised in a structured way.  So a followed rule does imply information within the semantics of that rule.  Finally, name any law or idea or information you like: If it is not eventually implemented in a physical object it is hollow and powerless; it will often be quickly forgotten as of no consequence.  Hence the need for an interpenetrating (but not perfectly symmetrical) “direct” and “indirect” within our materialistic monism (including consciousness).

Yes, math is very important in physics. That does not change the fact that math is conceptual and that when you assume that reality is fundamentally mathematical, you have assumed platonic idealism.

I think there is a confusion here between the math that is able to model an aspect of reality and reality itself.  Clearly when modelling nothingness things may seem to get fairly simplistic.  The classical representation of nothing was mathematical zero.  Zero and its inverse, infinity, are still good for modelling the limits of classical reality.  But the QM model of nothing is not so mathematically simple.  Instead of zero we have particles and anti-particles that anihilate each other in an inherently unstable soup.  Either way,classical or QM, Platonic idealism is an outmoded concept in the world of math and only entertained in the philosophy of mystics.

There certainly is no excuse grasping at magic explanations (strong emergence).

 
Where exactly does Cahill’s paper, in its support of an emergent system that has no a priori objects or laws, make an appeal to magic?  Nowhere - and neither would I.

I just pointed out that the paper considers both space and its origin non-local, so at the very least there is no strong emergence of locality from non-locality. If you think otherwise, the burden is upon you, not me, to point out what it is that is strongly emergent according to the paper.

Neither the paper nor I talk about a concept of locality emerging from non-locality in a QM sense.  But the paper does talk about three dimensions emerging from something that previously was objectless.  For instance, p11: “Previously it was shown that space and quantum physics are emergent and unified, with time a distinct non-geometric process, that quantum phenomena are caused by fractal topological defects embedded in and forming a growing three-dimensional fractal process-space, which is essentially a quantum foam.” 


BTW would that seem like the description of a non-magical strong emergence to you?  I guess you might argue that QM’s very emergence from whatever “nothingness” or “fractal topological defects” preceded it is another example of weak emergence and maybe you would be right.  Ah, but how much more advanced our understanding of nothingness & somethingness would be.  In a limited classical sense however, Cahill’s paper would seem to present a model of something from nothing.  So our exploration of this topic, something from nothing, is not BS, but perhaps one of the most important frontiers science can consider…

 Signature 

“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”  (The first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted unanimously by the Virginia Convention of Delegates on June 12, 1776)

Profile
 
 
Posted: 19 January 2012 11:33 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 54 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 19 January 2012 02:44 AM

Knowing some “truth” clearly has a part that is greater than mere experience or “the (subjective) feeing of knowing”.  It can imply an acceptance of objective reality, as you have indicated you do, and knowing something of that objective reality.  It can also imply a reductionist knowing of an analysed part of reality.

This is too vague… “knowing has a greater part than experience”. What does that even mean? Just try and give an example of knowing that is not experienced. Is the thought of 1+1=2 fundamentally different from the thought of 1+1=5, or are they both just thoughts? How do we even know what “1” is, and that adding “1” to that results in 2? It all comes from experience.

Ok - I think you can guess my difficulty with your answer.  You try to interpolate from the 5 senses of modern human mind/bodies to primordial C (PC) that has no body and, according to your interpolations, simply “experiences”.  But how does PC experience without a body at all?  So yes, I would like the detailed explanation when you have the time.

Where did i say “no body”? Perhaps you confuse “body” with “brain”, but physics tells us that a brain is merely a physical object, and that the physical world is far larger than just brains.

I said “such a system has no a priori objects or laws” means it initially has no information or semantics but rather just random data.  You answered

The paper ... does not mention that information is created from non-information. A law is a set mechanism, and the lack of that does not imply lack of information. A lack of objects doesnt either.

I think the idea that information is created is the whole point of the paper and of emergence.  And what is information created from?  Surely in its most basic form, it is created from disorganised data of some kind.  But how can we know it is disorganised?  Because it does not conform to some rule or law that if followed, would cause the data to be organised in a structured way.  So a followed rule does imply information within the semantics of that rule.  Finally, name any law or idea or information you like: If it is not eventually implemented in a physical object it is hollow and powerless; it will often be quickly forgotten as of no consequence.  Hence the need for an interpenetrating (but not perfectly symmetrical) “direct” and “indirect” within our materialistic monism (including consciousness).

Yes i know you answered that data is different from information, but we were talking about the paper. So show where the paper says there is such a difference, or where it mentions that information can strongly emerge from noninformation. Also, to give me an idea of what you mean with “data”, can you give me an example of it?


Im my previous post i suggested to people that they stick closely to known natural facts, and i think your use of the terms “knowledge” and “data” may be examples of where you do not follow this advice.

I think there is a confusion here between the math that is able to model an aspect of reality and reality itself.  Clearly when modelling nothingness things may seem to get fairly simplistic.  The classical representation of nothing was mathematical zero.  Zero and its inverse, infinity, are still good for modelling the limits of classical reality.  But the QM model of nothing is not so mathematically simple.  Instead of zero we have particles and anti-particles that anihilate each other in an inherently unstable soup.  Either way,classical or QM, Platonic idealism is an outmoded concept in the world of math and only entertained in the philosophy of mystics.

There indeed is such confusion, and it has had by people who believe “energy” actually exists out there. The idea of particles popping in and out of existence, or annihilating each other, is a result of this confusion.

Where exactly does Cahill’s paper, in its support of an emergent system that has no a priori objects or laws, make an appeal to magic?  Nowhere - and neither would I.

The paper says nothing about strong emergence. You do.

Neither the paper nor I talk about a concept of locality emerging from non-locality in a QM sense.  But the paper does talk about three dimensions emerging from something that previously was objectless.  For instance, p11: “Previously it was shown that space and quantum physics are emergent and unified, with time a distinct non-geometric process, that quantum phenomena are caused by fractal topological defects embedded in and forming a growing three-dimensional fractal process-space, which is essentially a quantum foam.”

And the space (3 dimensions) is still nonlocal, thus there is no strong emergence there.

BTW would that seem like the description of a non-magical strong emergence to you?  I guess you might argue that QM’s very emergence from whatever “nothingness” or “fractal topological defects” preceded it is another example of weak emergence and maybe you would be right.  Ah, but how much more advanced our understanding of nothingness & somethingness would be.  In a limited classical sense however, Cahill’s paper would seem to present a model of something from nothing.  So our exploration of this topic, something from nothing, is not BS, but perhaps one of the most important frontiers science can consider…

Its just the same old “simple thing gets more complex”. The paper would increase our understanding of the “simple thing”.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 19 January 2012 05:18 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 55 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  173
Joined  2011-10-16
srrr - 19 January 2012 11:33 AM
Michael Kean - 19 January 2012 02:44 AM

Knowing some “truth” clearly has a part that is greater than mere experience or “the (subjective) feeing of knowing”.  It can imply an acceptance of objective reality, as you have indicated you do, and knowing something of that objective reality.  It can also imply a reductionist knowing of an analysed part of reality.

This is too vague…Just try and give an example of knowing that is not experienced. Is the thought of 1+1=2 fundamentally different from the thought of 1+1=5, or are they both just thoughts? How do we even know what “1” is, and that adding “1” to that results in 2? It all comes from experience.

Why do you go round in circles?  You accept “science” or “objective knowing”.  You accept an objective reality.  You reject mysticism.  So you ‘know’ the ‘difference’ between the objective and subjective.  Sure the objective knowledge of the collective emerges from the subjective past experiences of individuals, but is the mathematical (i.e. objective but indirect) fact that 1 + 1 =  2 and not 5 reduced by ongoing experience?  So here then is the difference between knowledge and experience.

Ok - I think you can guess my difficulty with your answer.  You try to interpolate from the 5 senses of modern human mind/bodies to primordial C (PC) that has no body and, according to your interpolations, simply “experiences”.  But how does PC experience without a body at all?  So yes, I would like the detailed explanation when you have the time.

Where did i say “no body”? Perhaps you confuse “body” with “brain”, but physics tells us that a brain is merely a physical object, and that the physical world is far larger than just brains.

More redirection?  Everyone on this blog understands the term mind/body and that in this context, brain is part of body.  So again, how does PC “experience” without matter, without body, without brain?

I said “such a system has no a priori objects or laws” means it initially has no information or semantics but rather just random data.  You (srrr) answered

The paper ... does not mention that information is created from non-information. A law is a set mechanism, and the lack of that does not imply lack of information. A lack of objects doesnt either.

I think the idea that information is created is the whole point of the paper and of emergence.  And what is information created from?  Surely in its most basic form, it is created from disorganised data of some kind.  But how can we know it is disorganised?  Because it does not conform to some rule or law that if followed, would cause the data to be organised in a structured way.  So a followed rule does imply information within the semantics of that rule.  Finally, name any law or idea or information you like: If it is not eventually implemented in a physical object it is hollow and powerless; it will often be quickly forgotten as of no consequence.  Hence the need for an interpenetrating (but not perfectly symmetrical) “direct” and “indirect” within our materialistic monism (including consciousness).

Yes i know you answered that data is different from information, but we were talking about the paper. So show where the paper says there is such a difference, or where it mentions that information can strongly emerge from noninformation. Also, to give me an idea of what you mean with “data”, can you give me an example of it?

More redirection?  My use of “data” was a minor correction of your tautological term “random information”.  So if you understood your term, then you should understand “data” even more clearly.  Next, you rightly saw that the paper doesn’t use the term data, but it does use terms like “quantum foam” and “fractal topological defects”, i.e. things that lack structure and semantics prior to the emergence of QM, space, matter, etc.

I think there is a confusion here between the math that is able to model an aspect of reality and reality itself.  Clearly when modelling nothingness things may seem to get fairly simplistic.  The classical representation of nothing was mathematical zero.  Zero and its inverse, infinity, are still good for modelling the limits of classical reality.  But the QM model of nothing is not so mathematically simple.  Instead of zero we have particles and anti-particles that anihilate each other in an inherently unstable soup.  Either way,classical or QM, Platonic idealism is an outmoded concept in the world of math and only entertained in the philosophy of mystics.

There indeed is such confusion, and it has had by people who believe “energy” actually exists out there. The idea of particles popping in and out of existence, or annihilating each other, is a result of this confusion.

You’re living in a scientific denial.  And you deny any modelling of the indirect whatsoever outside of your subjective notion of primordial consciousness.  How did this PC arise?  Or better still, explain to me why PC didn’t arise through normal weak emergence just like everything else.  Remember - you accept the notion of weak emergence.  But PC is the one thing that didn’t weakly emerge, is that it?  Then PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically deny - strong emergence!

I guess you might argue that QM’s very emergence from whatever “nothingness” or “fractal topological defects” preceded it is another example of weak emergence and maybe you would be right.  Ah, but how much more advanced our understanding of nothingness & somethingness would be.  In a limited classical sense however, Cahill’s paper would seem to present a model of something from nothing.  So our exploration of this topic, something from nothing, is not BS, but perhaps one of the most important frontiers science can consider…

Its just the same old “simple thing gets more complex”. The paper would increase our understanding of the “simple thing”.

So here we conclude on a point of agreement.  After I generously conceded that emergence of space, time and matter in our universe from nothing but “fractal topological defects” in a “quantum foam” could be seen as a weak emergence, you agreed that “Its just the same old “simple thing gets more complex”” and “the paper would increase our understanding of the “simple thing”“.  Wow!  The weak emergence of an entire self-initiating, self-organising universe from a non-material foam is a “simple thing” that doesn’t even impinge on the truly “hard problem” of your subjective PC!  Well maybe you’re wrong.  Maybe it does impinge on your PC.  Maybe quantum nothingness and pre-quantum nothingness are exactly the simple things that knock PC out of the water (or ball park).  Again, if PC didn’t weakly emerge, then PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically deny in the way you define it - strong emergence!  Get rid of it srrr!

 Signature 

“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”  (The first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted unanimously by the Virginia Convention of Delegates on June 12, 1776)

Profile
 
 
Posted: 20 January 2012 02:28 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 56 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 19 January 2012 05:18 PM

Why do you go round in circles?  You accept “science” or “objective knowing”.  You accept an objective reality.  You reject mysticism.  So you ‘know’ the ‘difference’ between the objective and subjective.  Sure the objective knowledge of the collective emerges from the subjective past experiences of individuals, but is the mathematical (i.e. objective but indirect) fact that 1 + 1 =  2 and not 5 reduced by ongoing experience?  So here then is the difference between knowledge and experience.

What is “objective knowledge”? Do rocks “know” that the world is round? Also, what do you mean with “a mathematical fact reduced by ongoing experience”? You are saying these things, but to me it reads more like poetry than something that makes sense.

More redirection?  Everyone on this blog understands the term mind/body and that in this context, brain is part of body.  So again, how does PC “experience” without matter, without body, without brain?

So you are not just talking about brains when you say “body”, but you are talking about all of physical reality. And when you say that i say that PC has no body, you mean that i said there was some point in time when there existed nothing physical? Quote me where i said that.

More redirection?  My use of “data” was a minor correction of your tautological term “random information”.  So if you understood your term, then you should understand “data” even more clearly.  Next, you rightly saw that the paper doesn’t use the term data, but it does use terms like “quantum foam” and “fractal topological defects”, i.e. things that lack structure and semantics prior to the emergence of QM, space, matter, etc.

I got my random information terminology from the paper, i didnt invent it myself. Your distinction between data and information is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. You keep saying the paper argues in favor of strong emergence (aka magic), and you defend this inventing your own distinction between data and information. I can only conclude that the paper does not support strong emergence.

You’re living in a scientific denial.  And you deny any modelling of the indirect whatsoever outside of your subjective notion of primordial consciousness.  How did this PC arise?  Or better still, explain to me why PC didn’t arise through normal weak emergence just like everything else.  Remember - you accept the notion of weak emergence.  But PC is the one thing that didn’t weakly emerge, is that it?  Then PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically deny - strong emergence!

Do i deny modelling outside of consciousness? Of course. Just like i deny dreaming outside of consciousness. Modelling is a conscious activity, the very idea of nonconscious modelling is a contradiction, like a nondreamed dream. If you think nonconcious matter can do it, just try and show an example of it that happens in nature.

So here we conclude on a point of agreement.  After I generously conceded that emergence of space, time and matter in our universe from nothing but “fractal topological defects” in a “quantum foam” could be seen as a weak emergence, you agreed that “Its just the same old “simple thing gets more complex”” and “the paper would increase our understanding of the “simple thing”“.  Wow!  The weak emergence of an entire self-initiating, self-organising universe from a non-material foam is a “simple thing” that doesn’t even impinge on the truly “hard problem” of your subjective PC!  Well maybe you’re wrong.  Maybe it does impinge on your PC.  Maybe quantum nothingness and pre-quantum nothingness are exactly the simple things that knock PC out of the water (or ball park).  Again, if PC didn’t weakly emerge, then PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically deny in the way you define it - strong emergence!  Get rid of it srrr!

Just to clarify: weak emergence is about quantitative differences, about simple things getting more complex. Example: a car accelerates from 50 km/h to 51 km/h. A quantitative difference in motion. Hence we talk about “simple (primitive) consciousness” that has evolved over time into “complex (human) consciousness”. This is completely different from consciousness emerging from an utter lack of consciousness, which physicalism, and even the panproto or neutral monism boil down to.


However it is possible we agree without knowing it. It could be that your panproto stuff is the same as what i call simple C. Can you tell me what you mean with the panproto stuff, what it is? What i can say about my simple C, is that anything that is a simplified or more extreme version of what we know complex consciousness does, fits the bill of simple C. If panproto stuff involves any abstraction, any representation, any illusion, any math, etc. then in my book its simple C.

[ Edited: 20 January 2012 02:43 AM by srrr]
Profile
 
 
Posted: 20 January 2012 07:07 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 57 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  173
Joined  2011-10-16
srrr - 20 January 2012 02:28 AM
Michael Kean - 19 January 2012 05:18 PM

Why do you go round in circles?  You accept “science” or “objective knowing”.  You accept an objective reality.  You reject mysticism.  So you ‘know’ the ‘difference’ between the objective and subjective.  Sure the objective knowledge of the collective emerges from the subjective past experiences of individuals, but is the mathematical (i.e. objective but indirect) fact that 1 + 1 =  2 and not 5 reduced by ongoing experience?  So here then is the difference between knowledge and experience.

What is “objective knowledge”? Do rocks “know” that the world is round? Also, what do you mean with “a mathematical fact reduced by ongoing experience”? You are saying these things, but to me it reads more like poetry than something that makes sense.

Surely your objective knowledge is your knowledge of the objective reality that you agree exists?  For instance, objective reality reinforces to you and me the objective knowledge that 1 + 1 = 2.  This is more than a simple intersubjective knowledge: Like all objective knowledge, it is a knowledge that stands or falls independent of the peculiarities of the ‘subject’.  In fact many would agree with me that in the special case of the mathematical knowledge just mentioned, it is a knowledge that stands independent of the peculiarities of this universe as well (i.e. it would stand in any universe).  Thus the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 is not reduced or falsified by the ongoing experiences of anything in this universe (including rocks).

More redirection?  Everyone on this blog understands the term mind/body and that in this context, brain is part of body.  So again, how does PC “experience” without matter, without body, without brain?

So you are not just talking about brains when you say “body”, but you are talking about all of physical reality. And when you say that i say that PC has no body, you mean that i said there was some point in time when there existed nothing physical? Quote me where i said that.


Interesting.  So does that mean you believe consciousness necessarily has a physical aspect, including primordial consciousness?  Wonderful!  But then you have the hard problem of matter weakly emerging.  Would you agree that matter could have weakly emerged from “fractal topological defects” in a “quantum foam”?  Great!

More redirection?  My use of “data” was a minor correction of your tautological term “random information”.  So if you understood your term, then you should understand “data” even more clearly.  Next, you rightly saw that the paper doesn’t use the term data, but it does use terms like “quantum foam” and “fractal topological defects”, i.e. things that lack structure and semantics prior to the emergence of QM, space, matter, etc.

I got my random information terminology from the paper, i didnt invent it myself. Your distinction between data and information is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. You keep saying the paper argues in favor of strong emergence (aka magic), and you defend this inventing your own distinction between data and information. I can only conclude that the paper does not support strong emergence.

You did not quote the paper when you used the term “random information” so it remains your term.  The distinction between data and information is in many places throughout the paper, as already quoted.  This doesn’t have great significance in itself - it just supports weak emergence and not your definition of strong emergence.  I conceded that strong emergence according to your definition does not get a mention in the paper, but that weak emergence of 3D from something a-dimensional or quantum fields from something a-quantum, is incredibly significant at the very least in terms of the presentation of a model that supports the idea, at least in classical (Newtonian) terms, of something from nothing.  It gets us a lot closer to the idea than anything I’ve seen before.  But don’t get me wrong here.  I’ve never been a supporter of magical strong emergence either.  I’ve always supported the idea that some instances of what you call weak emergence are pretty special - so special I would put them in a different category.  These include the emergence of matter-space-time from the “fractal topological defects” in a “quantum foam”, the four interactions of the standard model, life itself and human consciousness.

You’re living in a scientific denial.  And you deny any modelling of the indirect whatsoever outside of your subjective notion of primordial consciousness.  How did this PC arise?  Or better still, explain to me why PC didn’t arise through normal weak emergence just like everything else.  Remember - you accept the notion of weak emergence.  But PC is the one thing that didn’t weakly emerge, is that it?  Then PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically deny - strong emergence!

Do i deny modelling outside of consciousness?

More redirection.  Please answer the hard question: How did primordial consciousness (PC) arise?  Or better still, explain to me why PC didn’t arise through normal weak emergence just like everything else.  Remember - you accept the notion of weak emergence.  But if PC is the one thing that didn’t weakly emerge, then doesn’t it stand to reason that PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically reject - strong emergence as you define it?

So here we conclude on a point of agreement.  After I generously conceded that emergence of space, time and matter in our universe from nothing but “fractal topological defects” in a “quantum foam” could be seen as a weak emergence, you agreed that “Its just the same old “simple thing gets more complex”” and “the paper would increase our understanding of the “simple thing”“.  Wow!  The weak emergence of an entire self-initiating, self-organising universe from a non-material foam is a “simple thing” that doesn’t even impinge on the truly “hard problem” of your subjective PC!  Well maybe you’re wrong.  Maybe it does impinge on your PC.  Maybe quantum nothingness and pre-quantum nothingness are exactly the simple things that knock PC out of the water (or ball park).  Again, if PC didn’t weakly emerge, then PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically deny in the way you define it - strong emergence!  Get rid of it srrr!

Just to clarify: weak emergence is about quantitative differences, about simple things getting more complex. This is completely different from consciousness emerging from an utter lack of consciousness, which physicalism, and even the panproto or neutral monism boil down to.

As we have seen, weak emergence is now about more than simple “quantitative differences” if it applies to something without objects, laws, space and semantics then emerging into something with matter-space-time and self-generated semantics.  We would have to think very carefully about how to exactly define those “quantities” and those “differences”.  Again it seems I have shown that ‘how primordial consciousness came into existence’ is a question you cannot or will not tackle.  Like I said long ago in the other thread, it is an axiom of your “belief” (and thus subject to Gödel limitations and therefore error).  You believe in the mystical eternity of consciousness as a brute fact, like religious believers believe in an eternal god.  In this sense you are a mystic.  Not only that, but it seems you reject any attempt at a reductionism beyond primordial consciousness as a kind of heresy.  I think this is the essential problem with your philosophy.  I am willing to accept that reductionism may fail to produce a scientific understanding of e.g. what happened before the “quantum foam”.  That is, I do not hold a belief in “reductionism” - I just recognise it as something useful in the dance of life.  You say you agree there is an objective reality, but if anything in that reality challenges your belief in primordial consciousness then you seem to reject it out-of-hand.  By this means your philosophy seems to be reduced to the solipsism that Eucaryote has suggested from the beginning.

However it is possible we agree without knowing it. It could be that your panproto stuff is the same as what i call simple C. Can you tell me what you mean with the panproto stuff, what it is? What i can say about my simple C, is that anything that is a simplified or more extreme version of what we know complex consciousness does, fits the bill of simple C. If panproto stuff involves any abstraction, any representation, any illusion, any math, etc. then in my book its simple C.

Ok - Panprotoexperientialism means experiencing can weakly emerge from earlier, simpler versions of experiencing to the point where we would no longer recognise it as what we would call experiencing (and beyond this point too).  Just like the human species emerged from much simpler species.  The really interesting point in this scenario is life’s abiogenesis.  Can we say for instance that non-life is life? Not in any usual taxonomy we might employ.  Why is this?  Because emergence is fractal - it happens between the cracks of any usual or classical taxonomy.  Similarly the emergence of experience or three dimensions or matter.  What does this all mean?  That we may never get to the actual point of something from nothing in the classical sense of zero becoming non-zero, but that we will probably get closer to that point with an ongoing exploration of the objective reality through science.  That’s all.  And along the way we will strike many points where under a classical but slightly faulty taxonomy we would be perhaps right to conclude a ‘something from nothing’ (such as life from non-life).  Semantics are self-generating in an emergent, self-contained and self-organising system, so meanings and taxonomies will come-and-go along with everything else.  I think this is the only form of materialist monism that is not reliant on a fallible axiom or belief…

 Signature 

“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”  (The first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted unanimously by the Virginia Convention of Delegates on June 12, 1776)

Profile
 
 
Posted: 21 January 2012 11:40 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 58 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22
Michael Kean - 20 January 2012 07:07 PM

Surely your objective knowledge is your knowledge of the objective reality that you agree exists?  For instance, objective reality reinforces to you and me the objective knowledge that 1 + 1 = 2.  This is more than a simple intersubjective knowledge: Like all objective knowledge, it is a knowledge that stands or falls independent of the peculiarities of the ‘subject’.  In fact many would agree with me that in the special case of the mathematical knowledge just mentioned, it is a knowledge that stands independent of the peculiarities of this universe as well (i.e. it would stand in any universe).  Thus the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 is not reduced or falsified by the ongoing experiences of anything in this universe (including rocks).

Objective knowledge is no different from intersubjective knowledge. If two people both know that a tree exists, then this knowledge still exists in their minds, and not in some “objective knowledge” space floating inbetween their heads. And when they both die, the knowledge doesnt exist anymore. Sure the tree does, but the tree consists of elementary particles and forces, it doesnt consist of “knowledge”.

Interesting.  So does that mean you believe consciousness necessarily has a physical aspect, including primordial consciousness?  Wonderful!  But then you have the hard problem of matter weakly emerging.  Would you agree that matter could have weakly emerged from “fractal topological defects” in a “quantum foam”?  Great!

That entirely depends on what “physical” means. For example, the paper argues that it is all just information. Some people (i think Dennett is one of them) often say that consciousness is a vague term, that noone really knows what it refers to, and that upon closer inspection, it cant even be found at all. Well if thats true for consciousness, then it is 100 times more true for “physical”. All we really know about “the physical” is what our senses and math tell us, and upon closer inspection and analysis, it becomes ever more empty and abstract. Each physics experiment tells us that our previous knowledge of the physical was incomplete or innacurate, and there’s no telling what it will turn out to be.

You did not quote the paper when you used the term “random information” so it remains your term.

Heres where i got the random information/truths from. From the paper:

Here the key feature is the G¨odel boundary demarcating the provable from the unprovable truths of some system. Chaitin, using Algorithmic Information Theory, has demonstrated that in mathematics the unprovable truths are essentially random in character. This, however, is a structural randomness in the sense that the individual truths do not have any structure to them which could be exploited to condense them down to or be encoded in axioms.

Now its your turn:

The distinction between data and information is in many places throughout the paper, as already quoted.

Please quote where the paper makes such distinction between data and information.

More redirection.  Please answer the hard question: How did primordial consciousness (PC) arise?  Or better still, explain to me why PC didn’t arise through normal weak emergence just like everything else.  Remember - you accept the notion of weak emergence.  But if PC is the one thing that didn’t weakly emerge, then doesn’t it stand to reason that PC is the absolute example of the thing you categorically reject - strong emergence as you define it?

Remember, weak emergence is about quantitative differences. So yes, PC has quantitative differences. Examples are humans and rabbits: both conscious, but differently.

As we have seen, weak emergence is now about more than simple “quantitative differences” if it applies to something without objects, laws, space and semantics then emerging into something with matter-space-time and self-generated semantics. We would have to think very carefully about how to exactly define those “quantities” and those “differences”.  Again it seems I have shown that ‘how primordial consciousness came into existence’ is a question you cannot or will not tackle.  Like I said long ago in the other thread, it is an axiom of your “belief” (and thus subject to Gödel limitations and therefore error).  You believe in the mystical eternity of consciousness as a brute fact, like religious believers believe in an eternal god.  In this sense you are a mystic.  Not only that, but it seems you reject any attempt at a reductionism beyond primordial consciousness as a kind of heresy.  I think this is the essential problem with your philosophy.  I am willing to accept that reductionism may fail to produce a scientific understanding of e.g. what happened before the “quantum foam”.  That is, I do not hold a belief in “reductionism” - I just recognise it as something useful in the dance of life.  You say you agree there is an objective reality, but if anything in that reality challenges your belief in primordial consciousness then you seem to reject it out-of-hand.  By this means your philosophy seems to be reduced to the solipsism that Eucaryote has suggested from the beginning.

Its simple: just quote the paper where it argues in favor of strong emergence, and then you can claim the paper supports strong emergence. So far we have seen that the paper instead talks about a panexperientist information system. You coming up with this paper is like richard dawkins saying that he believes in the bible.

Ok - Panprotoexperientialism means experiencing can weakly emerge from earlier, simpler versions of experiencing to the point where we would no longer recognise it as what we would call experiencing (and beyond this point too).  Just like the human species emerged from much simpler species.  The really interesting point in this scenario is life’s abiogenesis.  Can we say for instance that non-life is life? Not in any usual taxonomy we might employ.  Why is this?  Because emergence is fractal - it happens between the cracks of any usual or classical taxonomy.  Similarly the emergence of experience or three dimensions or matter.  What does this all mean?  That we may never get to the actual point of something from nothing in the classical sense of zero becoming non-zero, but that we will probably get closer to that point with an ongoing exploration of the objective reality through science.  That’s all.  And along the way we will strike many points where under a classical but slightly faulty taxonomy we would be perhaps right to conclude a ‘something from nothing’ (such as life from non-life).  Semantics are self-generating in an emergent, self-contained and self-organising system, so meanings and taxonomies will come-and-go along with everything else.  I think this is the only form of materialist monism that is not reliant on a fallible axiom or belief…

The difference between life and non-life is exactly the same as the heap in Sorite’s paradox. You have 1000 grains of sand, and call it a “heap”. Then you take 1 grain of sand away, is it still a heap? At what point does it stop being a heap? The answer is that “heapness” is an arbitrary definition (label) that we humans assign to the grains of sand. “Heapness” is not a physical property and therefore “heap” does not have a physical starting point. Physically, any heap or nonheap is just a collection of elementary particles and fundamental forces, and those have been around since at least the big bang. The same goes for non-life and life. Physically its both just chemistry, and that in turn is just elementary particles and forces. The same goes for the “species”, which are just human classifications given to the quantitative differences between organisms.


Similarly, imagine that two planets in space slowly move away from eachother. In situation A the planets are 1 million km apart. In situation B they are 2 million km apart. Now i could call situation A “life” and B “non-life”, and then say that both are entirely different phenomena and that “life started there”. But physically, there is merely a quantitative difference in space (the distance between the planets) between the two situations. That “starting point” is entirely arbitrary, because it depends on a mental construct, a definition, as opposed to some actual new physical property coming into existence.


Btw, you say that experience emerges from simpler experience (you are correct so far), “until we no longer recognise it as experiencing”. You see the problem with that? It implies that the very first experience exists because we recognise it as an experience. But recognising is an experience in the first place, so where did that come from? So yes, weak emergence allows the experiences to get ever more different, simple and abstract as we go back in time towards PC. But thats it. You cannot just say “oh the experience so simple now, lets make it go away altogether”. It may be tempting (especially for people who think consciousness is some unnatural thing that doesnt belong in this physical universe) but really it is the equivelent of creationism.

[ Edited: 21 January 2012 11:52 AM by srrr]
Profile
 
 
Posted: 21 January 2012 02:31 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 59 ]  
Jr. Member
RankRank
Total Posts:  76
Joined  2011-08-15

.

[ Edited: 31 January 2012 06:06 PM by ...]
Profile
 
 
Posted: 21 January 2012 03:32 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 60 ]  
Member
RankRankRank
Total Posts:  233
Joined  2011-10-22

ill reply more later, but first i want to say im not a female, cus i got something hanging between my legs ;)

Profile
 
 
   
4 of 9
4
 
RSS 2.0     Atom Feed